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Abstract. We study a class of second order variational inequalities with bilateral
constraints. Under certain conditions we show the existence of a unique viscosity solution
of these variational inequalities and give a stochastic representation to this solution. As
an application, we study a stochastic game with stopping times and show the existence
of a saddle point equilibrium.
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1. Introduction and preliminaries
We study a class of second order nonlinear variational inequalities with bilateral con-
straints. This type of inequalities arises in zero sum stochastic differential games of mixed
type where each player uses both continuous control and stopping times. Under a non-
degeneracy assumption Bensoussan and Friedman [1, 4] have studied this type of problems.
They proved the existence of a unique solution of these variational inequalities in certain
weighted Sobolev spaces. This result together with certain techniques from stochastic cal-
culus is then applied to show that the unique solution of these inequalities is the value
function of certain stochastic differential games of mixed type. In this paper we study the
same class of variational inequalities without the non-degeneracy assumption. The non-
degeneracy assumption is crucially used in the analysis of the problem in [1, 4]. Thus the
method used in [1, 4] does not apply to the degenerate case. We study the problem via the
theory of viscosity solutions. We transform the variational inequalities with bilateral con-
straints to Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs (HJI for short) equations associated with a stochastic
differential game problem with continuous control only. Then using standard results from
the theory of viscosity solutions, we show that the value function of this stochastic differ-
ential game with continuous control is the unique viscosity solution of the corresponding
variational inequalities. Then for a special case we identify this unique viscosity solution
as the value function of the stochastic game with stopping times. We now describe our
problem.
Let U
i
; i D 1; 2, be the compact metric spaces. Let
b : Rd  U1  U2 ! R
d
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and
a : Rd  U1  U2 ! R
dd
:
We assume that:
(A1)
The functions b and a are bounded and continuous, a.x; u1; u2/ is C2 in x uniformly with
respect to u1; u2. The matrix a is symmetric and non-negative definite. Further there exists
constant C1 > 0 such that for all ui 2 Ui; i D 1; 2,
jb.x; u1; u2/− b.y; u1; u2/j  C1jx − yj:
Let
r : Rd  U1  U2 ! R
and
 
i
: Rd ! R; i D 1; 2:
We assume that
(A2)
(i) r;  1;  2 are bounded and continuous.
(ii) There exists a constant C2 > 0 such that for all x; y 2 Rd ; .u1; u2/ 2 U1  U2,
jr.x; u1; u2/− r.y; u1; u2/j C j 1.x/−  1.y/j C j 2.x/−  2.y/j
 C2jx − yj:
(iii)  2   1.
Let HC; H− : Rd  Rd  Rdd ! R be defined by
H
C
.x; p;X/ D inf
u12U1
sup
u22U2
[
1
2
tr.a.x; u1; u2/X/
C b.x; u1; u2/  p C r.x; u1; u2/
]
;
H
−
.x; p;X/ D sup
u22U2
inf
u12U1
[
1
2
tr.a.x; u1; u2/X/
C b.x; u1; u2/  p C r.x; u1; u2/
]
:
Consider the following Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs variational inequalities with bilateral con-
straints
 2.x/  v.x/   1.x/; 8 x
v.x/−H
C
.x;Dv.x/;D
2
v.x// D 0; if  2.x/ < v.x/ <  1.x/
v.x/−H
C
.x;Dv.x/;D
2
v.x//  0; if v.x/ D  2.x/
v.x/−H
C
.x;Dv.x/;D
2
v.x//  0; if v.x/ D  1.x/









(1.1)
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and
 2.x/  v.x/   1.x/; 8 x
v.x/−H
−
.x;Dv.x/;D
2
v.x// D 0; if  2.x/ < v.x/ <  1.x/
v.x/−H
−
.x;Dv.x/;D
2
v.x//  0; if v.x/ D  2.x/
v.x/−H
−
.x;Dv.x/;D
2
v.x//  0; if v.x/ D  1.x/









: (1.2)
By a classical solution of (1.1), we mean a C2-function v satisfying (1.1). Similarly a
classical solution of (1.2) is defined.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. In §2, we introduce the notion of viscos-
ity solution and establish the existence of unique viscosity solutions of these variational
inequalities by a probabilistic method. In §3, we apply these variational inequalities to
treat a stochastic game with stopping times. We establish the existence of a saddle point
equilibrium for this problem. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2. Viscosity solutions
To motivate the definition of viscosity solutions of the variational inequalities we first
prove the following result.
Theorem 2.1. Assume (A2)(iii). A function v 2 C2.Rd/ is a classical solution of (1.1) if
and only if it is a classical solution of the equation
maxfminfv.x/−HC.x;Dv.x/;D2v.x//I .v.x/−  2.x//gI
.v.x/−  1.x//g D 0: (2.1)
Similarly a function v 2 C2.Rd/ is a classical solution of (1.2) if and only if it is a
classical solution of the equation
minfmaxfv.x/−H−.x;Dv.x/;D2v.x//I .v.x/−  1.x//gI
.v.x/−  2.x//g D 0: (2.2)
Proof. Let v be a classical solution of (1.1). Suppose x is such that 2.x/ < v.x/ <  1.x/.
Then
v.x/−H
C
.x;Dv.x/;D
2
v.x// D 0; v.x/−  2.x/ > 0;
v.x/−  1.x/ < 0:
Thus (2.1) clearly holds in this case. Now if v.x/ D  2.x/, then
minfv.x/−HC.x;Dv.x/;D2v.x//I .v.x/−  2.x//g D 0;
and hence (2.1) is satisfied. Finally assume v.x/ D  1.x/, then
minfv.x/−HC.x;Dv.x/;D2v.x//I .v.x/−  2.x//g  0;
and hence
maxfminfv.x/−HC.x;Dv.x/;D2v.x//I .v.x/−  2.x//gI
.v.x/−  1.x//g D 0:
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Thus v satisfies (2.1). We now show the converse. It is clear from (2.1) that v.x/   1.x/.
If v.x/ D  1.x/ for some x, then it clearly satisfies v.x/   2.x/ by (A2)(iii). Now let
v.x/ <  1.x/. Then from (2.1), we have
minfv.x/−HC.x;Dv.x/;D2v.x//I .v.x/−  2.x//g D 0
and hence v.x/ −  2.x/  0. Thus for all x, we have  2.x/  v.x/   1.x/. Now let
v.x/ <  1.x/. Then from the above equation, we have
v.x/−H
C
.x;Dv.x/;D
2
v.x//  0:
Similarly if v.x/ >  2.x/, we can show that
v.x/−H
C
.x;Dv.x/;D
2
v.x//  0:
Thus v is a classical solution of (1.1). This concludes the proof of the first part. The second
part of the theorem can be proved in a similar way. ¥
Remark 2.2. Under (A2)(iii), we can also show that a function v 2 C2.Rd/ is a classical
solution of (1.1) if and only if it is a classical solution of the equation
minfmaxfv.x/−HC.x;Dv.x/;D2v.x//I .v.x/−  1.x//gI
.v.x/−  2.x//g D 0:
Similarly a function v 2 C2.Rd/ is a classical solution of (1.2) if and only if it is a classical
solution of the equation
maxfminfv.x/−H−.x;Dv.x/;D2v.x//I .v.x/−  2.x//gI
.v.x/−  1.x//g D 0:
Theorem 2.1 motivates us to define viscosity solutions for (1.1) and (1.2) using (2.1)
and (2.2) repsectively.
DEFINITION 2.3
An upper semicontinuous function v : Rd ! R is said to be a viscosity subsolution
of (1.1) if it is a viscosity subsolution of (2.1). Similarly a lower semicontinuous func-
tion v : Rd ! R is said to be a viscosity supersolution of (1.1) if it is a viscosity
supersolution of (2.1). A function which is both sub- and super-solution of (1.1) is called
a viscosity solution of (1.1). Similarly, viscosity sub- and super-solutions of (1.2) are
defined.
We now address the question of showing the existence of unique viscosity solutions of
(1.1) and (1.2). This is done by showing that (1.1) and (1.2) are equivalent to Hamilton–
Jacobi–Isaacs equations corresponding to a stochastic differential game.
Let !1; !2 be two symbols. We formulate a zero sum stochastic differential. In this
game, NU
i
is the set of controls for player i, where NU
i
D U
i
[ f!
i
g; i D 1; 2. Let .; ; /
be the non-negative square root of a.; ; /: Extend b; ; r to
N
b : Rd  NU1  NU2 ! R
d
; N : Rd  NU1  NU2 ! R
dd
;
Nr : Rd  NU1  NU2 ! R;
A probabilistic approach to second order variational inequalities 435
respectively such that
N
b.x; !1; /  0; Nb.x; ; !2/  0; N.x; !1; /  0; N.x; ; !2/  0;
Nr.x; !1; u2/ D  1.x/ for all u2 2 U2 and Nr.x; ; !2/   2.x/:
Let .;F; P / be a complete probability space andW.t/ a standard d-dimensional Brown-
ian motion on it. Let NA
i
denote the set of all NU
i
-valued functions progressively measurable
with respect to the process W.t/. For . Nu1./; Nu2.// 2 NA1  NA2, consider the controlled
stochastic differential equation
d NX.t/ D Nb. NX.t/; Nu1.t/; Nu2.t// dt C N. NX.t/; u1.t/; u2.t// dW.t/
N
X.0/ D x
}
:
(2.3)
Let the payoff function be defined by
N
R.x; Nu1./; Nu2.// D E
[
∫
1
0
e−t Nr. NX.t/; Nu1.t/; Nu2.t// dt
]
:
A strategy for the player 1 is a ‘non-antiticipating’ map  : NA2 ! NA1, i.e., for any u2; Nu2 2
A2 such thatu2.s/ D Nu2.s/ for all 0  s  t then we have[u2].s/ D [ Nu2].s/; 0  s  t .
Let N0 denote the set of all non-anticipating strategies for player 1. Similarly strategies for
player 2 are defined. Let the set of all non-anticipating strategies for player 2 be denoted
by N1. Then the upper and lower value functions are defined by
N
V
C
.x/ D sup
2
N
1
inf
Nu12 NA1
N
R.x; Nu1./; [ Nu1].//;
N
V
−
.x/ D inf
2
N
0
sup
Nu22 NA2
N
R.x; [ Nu2]./; Nu2.//:
Then we can closely follow the arguments in [3] to show that under (A1) and (A2), NV C
and NV −, respectively, are unique viscosity solutions of
v.x/−
N
H
C
.x;Dv.x/;D
2
v.x// D 0 (2.4)
and
v.x/−
N
H
−
.x;Dv.x/;D
2
v.x// D 0 (2.5)
in the class of bounded continuous functions, where NHC; NH− : Rd  Rd  Rdd ! R
are defined as follows:
N
H
C
.x; p;X/ D inf
Nu12 NU1
sup
Nu22 NU2
[
1
2
tr. Oa.x; u1; u2/X/
C
N
b.x; Nu1; Nu2/  p C r.x; Nu1; Nu2/
]
;
N
H
−
.x; p;X/ D sup
Nu22 NU2
sup
Nu12 NU1
[
1
2
tr. Oa.x; u1; u2/X/
C
N
b.x; Nu1; Nu2/  p C r.x; Nu1; Nu2/
]
;
where Oa D N N . We now establish the equivalence of (1.1) and (1.2) with (2.4) and (2.5)
respectively.
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Theorem 2.4. Assume (A2)(iii). A continuous function v : Rd ! R is a viscosity solution
of (2.4) if and only if it is a viscosity solution of (1.1). Similarly a continuous function
v : Rd ! R is a viscosity solution of (2.5) if and only if it is a viscosity solution of (1.2).
Proof. The proof of this theorem is a simple consequence of the observation that
N
H
C
.x; p;X/ D .H
C
.x; p;X/ _  2.x// ^  1.x/ (2.6)
and
N
H
−
.x; p;X/ D .H
−
.x; p;X/ ^  1.x// _  2.x/: (2.7)
¥
As a consequence of this result we have the following existence and uniqueness result
for the solutions of (1.1) and (1.2).
COROLLARY 2.5
Assume (A1) and (A2). Then NV C and NV − are unique vicosity solutions of (1.1) and (1.2)
respectively in the class of bounded continuous functions.
Proof. Since (2.4) has a unique viscosity solution in the class of bounded continuous
functions given by V C, we get by Theorem 2.4, that NV C is the unique viscosity solution
of (1.1) in the class of bounded continuous functions. Similarly V − is the unique viscosity
solution of (1.2) in the class of bounded continuous functions. ¥
Remark 2.6. In the classical case, it is quite clear from the proof of Theorem 2.1 that under
(A2)(iii),  2  v   1 if v is a classical solution of (2.1). In fact this remains true even
in the case of viscosity solutions. Indeed assume (A2)(iii). Then any viscosity solution of
(2.1) satisfies
 2.x/  v.x/   1.x/; for all x 2 Rd :
Similar result holds for viscosity solutions of (2.2). Observe that  2 is a viscosity sub-
solution of (2.1) and  1 is a viscosity super-solution of (2.1). Thus the desired result
follows from a general comparison principle on viscosity solutions [2].
3. Application to stochastic games
In this section we consider a stochastic game with stopping times. We show the existence
of a value and a saddle point equilibrium for this problem. We now describe the stochastic
game with stopping times.
Let b : Rd ! Rd and  : Rd ! Rdd . Assume that b;  are bounded and Lipschitz
continuous. Consider the stochastic differential equation
dX.t/ D b.X.t// dt C .X.t// dW.t/; t > 0
X.0/ D x
}
: (3.1)
A probabilistic approach to second order variational inequalities 437
HereW is a d-dimensional Brownian motion on an underlying complete probability space
.;F; P /. Let r;  1;  2 : Rd ! R be bounded and Lipschitz continuous functions and
 1   2. Let  > 0. Define
R.x; ;  / D E
[
∫
^
0
e−sr.X.s// ds C e−.^/[ 1.X.//<
C  2.X.// ]
]
; (3.2)
where ;  are the stopping times with respect to the  -field generated by W.t/.
Let QW denote another d-dimensional Brownian motion independent of W , constructed
on an augmented probability space which is also denoted by .;F; P / by an abuse of
notation. Let γ : Rd ! Rd2d be defined by γ D [ γ I
d
], where I
d
is the d  d
identity matrix. Now consider the following stochastic differential equation
dXγ .t/ D b.Xγ .t// dt C γ .Xγ .t// dW.t/; t > 0
X
γ
.0/ D x
}
; (3.3)
whereW D [W; QW ]. Player 1 tries to minimizeR.x; ; /, as in (3.2), over stopping times
 (with respect to the  -field generated by W.t/), whereas player 2 tries to maximize the
same over stopping times  (with respect to the  -field generated byW.t/). Note that these
stopping times need not be finite a.s.. In other words, each player has the option of not
stopping the game at any time. We refer to [7] for a similar treatment to stochastic games
with stopping times. We now define the lower and upper value functions. Let
V
−
.x/ D sup
0
inf
0
R.x; ;  /;
V
C
.x/ D inf
0
sup
0
R.x; ;  /:
The stochastic game with stopping times is said to have a value if V C  V −.
We now establish the existence of a value for this problem. LetH : RdRdRdd ! R
be defined by
H.x; p;X/ D
1
2
tr .a.x/X/C b.x/  p C r.x/;
where a D  .
Theorem 3.1. The stochastic game with stopping times has a value and a saddle point
equilibrium. The value of this game is the unique viscosity solution in the class of bounded
and continuous functions of the variational inequalities with bilateral constraints given by
 2.x/  w.x/   1.x/; 8x
w.x/−H.x;Dw.x/;D
2
w.x// D 0; if  2.x/ < w.x/ <  1.x/
w.x/−H.x;Dw.x/;D
2
w.x//  0; if w.x/ D  2.x/
w.x/−H.x;Dw.x/;D
2
w.x//  0; if w.x/ D  1.x/









:
(3.4)
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Proof. Using the results of §2, it follows that there is a unique viscosity solutionw of (3.4)
in the class of bounded continuous functions. We now identify this solution as the value
function of the stochastic game with stopping times.
We first assume that w is C2. Let w.x/ >  2.x/. Let  be any stopping times. Define
the stopping time O by
O D infft  0 :  2.X.t// D w.X.t//g;
where X.t/ is a solution of (3.1) with the initial condition X.0/ D x. Since w is a smooth
viscosity solution of (3.4), by Ito’s formula, we have for any T > 0 and stopping time  ,
w.x/  E
{
∫
T^^O
0
e−sr.X.s// ds C e−.T^^O/w.X.T ^  ^ O/
}
:
Letting T ! 1 in the above equation, we obtain
w.x/  E
{
∫
^O
0
e−sr.X.s// ds C e−.^O/w.X. ^ O//
}
:
Now using the first inequality in (3.4) and the definition of O in the above, it follows that
w.x/  R.x; ; O/:
Since  is arbitrary, we get
w.x/  V
−
.x/:
Next let w is C2 and w.x/ <  1.x/. Define the stopping time O by
O
 D infft  0 :  1.X.t// D w.X.t//g;
where X.t/ is a solution of (3.1) with the initial condition X.0/ D x. Now using the
foregoing arguments we can show that
w.x/  V
C
.x/:
Thus
w  V
C
 V
−
:
We now prove this result for the general case. Let w

be the sup-convolution of w, i.e.,
w

.x/ D sup
2R
d
{
w./−
j − xj
2
2
}
:
Then w

! w uniformly in Rd as  ! 0, w

are bounded, Lipschitz continuous, semi-
convex and satisfy a.e. on Rd ,
w

.x/−H.x;Dw

.x/;D
2
w

.x//  0.x/;
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for a modulus 0 (see [8]). Now let w

be the standard mollification of w

. Then w

are
C
2;1
,w


! w

uniformly inRd andDw

.x/ ! Dw

.x/;D
2
w


.x/ ! D
2
w

.x/ for a.e.
x 2 R
d
. Also w

have the same Lipschitz constant as w

and for any γ > 0, we have
w


.x/−
γ
2
2
tr .D2w

.x//−H.x;Dw


.x/;D
2
w


.x//  0./
C g

.x/C
γ
2
d

; (3.5)
where g

are uniformly continuous. Let
r

.x; u1; u2/ D r.x; u1; u2/C 0./C
γ
2
d

:
We now assumew.x/ >  2.x/. Define the stopping time O as before. Thenw

.x/ >  2.x/
for sufficiently small  and . Applying Ito’s formula forw

, we obtain for any T > 0 and
any stopping time  ,
w


.x/  E
{
∫
T^^O
0
e−sr

.X
γ
.s// dsCe−.T^^O/w

.X
γ
.T ^  ^ O//
}
;
(3.6)
where Xγ .t/ is the solution of (3.3) with the initial condition Xγ .0/ D x.
By a standard martingale inequality, for any  > 0, we can find a constant R

such that
P
(
sup
0sT
jX
γ
.s/j  R

)
 :
Let 

 R
d be such that j

j   and g

! 0 uniformly on B
R

n 

. Using this we
can find a local modulus 1 such that
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
E
∫
T^^O
0
g

.X
γ
.s// ds
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
 1.; γ /:
Using this in (3.6), we obtain
w


.x/  E
{
∫
T^^O
0
e−sr.Xγ .s// ds C e−.T^^O/w

.X
γ
.T ^  ^ O//
}
C 2.; γ /C T
(
0./C
γ
2
d

)
; (3.7)
where 2 is a local modulus. Now using moment estimates [8], we have
E
(
sup
0sT
jX.s/−X
γ
.s/j
2
)
 Cγ
2
for some constant C > 0 which may depend on T and x. Now using this in (3.7), and
passing to the limits γ ! 0 and then ;  ! 0, we obtain
w.x/  E
{
∫
T^^O
0
e−sr.X.s// ds C e−.T^^O/w.X.T ^  ^ O//
}
:
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Now letting T ! 1, as before, we obtain
w.x/  V
−
.x/:
Similarly we can show that
w.x/  V
C
.x/
for all x such that 1.x/ > w.x/. Thus the stochastic game with stopping times has a value.
We now show that . O; O/ is a saddle point equilibrium. We need to prove this only when
 2.x/ < w.x/ <  1.x/. Using the foregoing arguments, we can show that
w.x/ D E
[
∫
O
^O
0
e−sr.X.s// ds C e− O^Ow.X. O ^ O//
]
D R.x;
O
; O/:
Clearly . O; O/ constitutes a saddle point equilibrium. ¥
Remark 3.2. The above result generalizes the optimal stopping time problem for degen-
erate diffusions studied by Menaldi [6]. Menaldi has characterized the value function in
the optimal stopping time problem as a maximal solution of the corresponding variational
inequalities with one sided constraint. He has used the penalization arguments to obtain his
results. Here we have used the method of viscosity solutions to generalize the optimal stop-
ping time problem to stochastic games with stopping times. We also wish to mention that
Stettner [7] has studied stochastic games with stopping times for a class of Feller Markov
processes. He has employed a penalization argument using semigroup theory. Thus our
approach is quite different from that of Stettner.
4. Conclusions
We have studied a class of second order variational inequalities with bilateral constraints.
Under certain conditions, we have showed the existence and uniqueness of viscosity solu-
tions by transforming the variational inequalities to HJI equations corresponding to a
stochastic differential game. Here we have confined our attention to a particular form of
H which arises in stochastic differential games of mixed type. A general form of H can
be reduced to this particular form by a suitable representation formula as in [5]. Thus our
probabilistic method can be used to prove the existence and uniqueness of viscosity solu-
tions for more general class of second order nonlinear variational inequalities with bilateral
constraints.
As an application, we have showed the existence of a value and a saddle point equi-
librium for a stochastic game with stopping times. We now give a brief description of a
stochastic differential game of mixed type where each player uses both continuous control
and stopping times.
Consider the following controlled stochastic differential equation
dX.t/ D b.X.t/; u1.t/; u2.t//dt C .X.t/; u1.t/; u2.t//dW.t/; t > 0
X.0/ D x
}
:
(4.1)
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HereW.t/ is a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion on an underlying complete prob-
ability space .;F; P / and  is the non-negative square root of a. The processes u1.t/
and u2.t/ are U1 and U2-valued control processes of players 1 and 2 respectively which
are progressively measurable with respect to the  -field generated by W.t/. Let  > 0 be
the discount factor. The payoff function is given by
R.x; u1./; ; u2./;  / D E
[
∫
^
0
e−sr.X.s/; u1.s/; u2.s// dt
C e−.^/[ 1.x.//< C  2.x. // ]
]
;
(4.2)
where ;  are the stopping times with respect to the filtration generated by W./.
An admissible control for player 1 is a map u1./ : [0;1/ ! U1 which is progressively
measurable with respect to the  -field generated byW./. The set of all admissible controls
for player 1 is denoted by A1. Similarly an admissible control for player 2 is defined. Let
A2 denote the set of all admissible controls for player 2.
We identify two controls u1./; Qu1./ in A1 on [0; t] if P.u1.s/ D Qu1.s/ for a.e. s 2
[0; t]/ D 1. Similarly we identify the controls in A2.
An admissible strategy for player 1 is a map  : A2 ! A1 such that if u2 D Qu2 on
[0; s] then [u2] D [ Qu2] for all s 2 [0;1/. The set of all admissible strategies for player
1 is denoted by 0. Similarly admissible strategies for player 2 are defined. Let 1 denote
the set of all admissible strategies for player 2.
Let S denote the set of all stopping times. Let O0 denote the set of all non-anticipating
maps O : A2 ! A1 S for player 1. Similarly let O1 denote the set of all non-anticipating
maps O : A1 ! A2  S for player 2. Player 1 tries to minimize R.x; u1./; ; u2./;  /
over his admissible control u1./ and stopping times  , whereas player 2 tries to maximize
the same over his admissible control u2./ and stopping times  . We now define the upper
and lower value functions of stochastic differential game of mixed type. Let
V
C
.x/ D sup
O
2
O
1
inf
u12A1;0
R.x; u1./; ; O[u1].//;
V
−
.x/ D inf
O2
O
0
sup
u22A2;0
R.x; O[u2]./; u2./;  /:
The functions V C and V − are respectively called upper and lower value functions of the
stochastic differential game of mixed type. This differential game is said to have a value
if both upper and lower value functions coincide. Now we make the following conjecture.
Conjecture. The value functions V C and V − are unique viscosity solutions of (1.1) and
(1.2) respectively in the class of bounded continuous functions.
Note that the above conjecture is true for the special case treated in §3. Analogous results
also holds when the matrix a is independent of the control variables and is uniformly
elliptic [1, 4].
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